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Abstract: Although empirical evidence shows that higher product market competition 
increases unionized wage, the theoretical literature did not pay much attention to this 
aspect. We show that the positive relation between product market competition and 
unionized wage may occur in the presence of external economies of scale. In this 
respect, the labor productivity and the effects of the external economies of scale may 
play important roles. 
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What is the effect of product market competition on unionized wage? In an influential 
paper, Dowrick (1989) shows that more firms in an industry reduces unionized wage 
in the presence of decentralized or firm-specific union-firm bargaining. Even if the 
theoretical work of Dowrick (1989) shows a negative relation between product market 
competition and unionized wage, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Many 
studies on the US have found that decreased product market competition reduces 
unionized wage (Bloch and Kuskin, 1978 and Freeman and Medoff, 1981). Abowd 
and Tracy (1989) show that the relation between four firm concentration of sales and 
the unionized wage is positive at low levels of concentration, but the relation is 
negative at high levels of concentration. Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) show that the 
effect of deregulation on the union wage premium vary considerably across industries. 
Stewart (1983), Macpherson and Stewart (1990) and Van Reenen (1996) show mixed 
evidences on the UK industry.  
Inspired by the empirical evidences, Bastos et al. (2010) provide open-shop 
union, where the union density is less than one, as a reason for the positive relation 
between product market competition and unionized wage. Considering a move from 
monopoly to duopoly, they show that the unionized wage is higher under the latter 
product market structure compared to the former if the union density is positive but 
very low. Thus, they conclude that the previous theoretical result showing a negative 
relation between competition and unionized wage is due to the assumption that union 
density is one, i.e., all workers are union members. 2 
 
We show in this paper that, if there are external economies of scale, the 
relation between competition and unionized wage may either increase or decrease 
even if the union density is one.  In this respect, the labor productivity and the effects 
of the external economies of scale may play important roles. Thus, we provide a new 
reason for the positive relation between competition and unionized wage, and suggest 
that open-shop union is not a necessary condition for creating the positive relation 
between higher competition and unionized wage.  
External economies of scale create a negative relation between the number of 
firms and a firm’s cost of production by affecting labor productivity. Hence, as 
competition increases, on the one hand, it tends to reduce the unionized wage by 
reducing the labor demand, but, on the other hand, it tends to increase the unionized 
wage by increasing labor productivity. As the effects of the external economies of 
scale increase, it strengthens the latter effect, thus increasing the possibility of a 
higher unionized wage following higher product market competition.  
The consideration of external economies of scale has clear empirical 
relevance. Caballero and Lyons (1990) show the evidence of external economies of 
scale in the manufacturing industries of Belgium, France, the UK and former West 
Germany. Their study suggests that external economies of scale are more prominent 
than internal economies of scale.  Broadberry and Marrison (2002) show the evidence 
of external economies of scale in the UK cotton industry. The presence of 
externalities created by external economies of scale is also acknowledged by Choi and 
Yu (2002), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) and several references therein.
1 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes. 
                                                 
1 See, Mukherjee (2010) for a recent theoretical work showing the welfare effects of entry in the 
presence of external economies of scale.  3 
 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there are n unionized firms in an industry competing like Cournot 
oligopolists with homogeneous products. For simplicity, all firms require only labor 




 is the labor productivity. However, there are external economies of 
scale. As the number of firm increases, it reduces each firm’s labor requirement. We 
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. Hence, in increases in n 
reduces the labor requirement at a decreasing rate. Although we feel that  0 λ′′ >  is a 
reasonable assumption, it is not necessary for our results, but it helps to show our 
results in the simplest way. 
We assume that wages are determined by bargaining between the firms and 
the firm-specific unions. We consider the right-to-manage model of labor union, as in 
Bughin and Vannini (1995), Vannini and Bughin (2000), López and Naylor (2004), 
Mukherjee (2008) and Bastos et al. (2010), to name a few, where the union-firm 
bargaining determines wage and the firms hire workers according to their 
requirements.
2 We assume for simplicity that the reservation wages of the workers are 
zero. Further, all workers are union members. Thus, we eliminate the effects of the 
open-shop unions, as shown in Bastos et al. (2010).  
We consider the following game. Given the number of firms, at stage 1, firms 
and unions bargain over wages. At stage 2, the firms hire workers according to their 
need and produce like Cournot oligopolists. We solve the game through backward 
induction. 
                                                 
2 See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favor of the right-to-manage models. 4 
 
We assume that the inverse market demand function is P = a – q, where P is 
price and q is the total output. 
 Given  the  wage,  i w , for firm i, 1,2..., in =  the ith firm maximizes the 
following expression to determine its output: 
  ()
i
ii q Max a q w q λ −− .          ( 1 )  
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Now we are in position to determine the unionized wage. We assume that the 





























,                 (3) 
where  θ  (resp. (1 ) θ − ) shows the union’s preference over wage,  i w  (resp. 
employment,  i q λ ). As θ  reduces, it increases the union’s preference for employment. 
If  0 θ = , the union cares about employment only, and it approximates the situation 
where the union acts as a price taker in a competitive labor market. If  0.5 θ = , the 
union is like a rent maximizing union. Although, in principle, we can consider 
[0,1] θ ∈ , it seems more responsible to consider that unions pay more attention to 
employment than wage. Hence, we restrict our attention to  [0,0.5] θ ∈ . 
The ith union bargains with the ith firm to determine  i w , i = 1, 2, …, n. We 
assume that bargaining powers of all unions are β  and that of all firms are (1 β − ). If 
1 β = , the union has full bargaining power. However, if  0 β = , the firm has the full 5 
 
bargaining power, and this situation creates the outcome similar to the competitive 





ii ii w Max U U
β
β ππ
− −− ,                        (4) 
In the case of disagreement, the utilities of the unions and the profits of the firms are 
zero. Since all workers are union members, there is no production in the ith firm in the 
case of disagreement, thus creating  0 ii U π = = . 
  Due to the symmetry of the firms and the unions, we get that the equilibrium 
wage maximizing (4) with  0 ii U π ==  as 
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.                        (5) 
It follows from (5) that if λ  does not depend on n, an increase in n reduces the 
equilibrium unionized wage, since (2 ) 0 β βθ − −>  for  [0,0.5] θ ∈  and  [0,1] β ∈ . 
This is in line with the existing works suggesting that higher competition reduces the 
unionized wage in the case of firm specific unions if the union density is one. 
However, if λ  falls with higher n, it creates a counter force, and tends to increase the 
equilibrium unionized wage. Therefore, the net effect of an increase in n on the 
equilibrium unionized wage depends on the strengths of the two opposing effects. 
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Since the second order condition for maximizing (4) implies  (2 ) (1 ) 0 n β βθ β − +− > , 
left hand side (LHS) and right hand side (RHS) of (6) are positive. 6 
 
  Condition (6) suggests that if the effects of external economies of scale are 
sufficiently strong (i.e.,  0 λ′<  and sufficiently high), higher competition increases the 
unionized wage. Since RHS of (6) is negatively related to both θ  and β , it suggests 
that higher values of θ  (i.e., unions’ higher preference for wage) and higher values of 
β  (i.e., higher bargaining power of the unions) increase the possibility of higher 
unionized wage following higher competition.  
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.                    (7) 
It follows from (7) that the relation between the LHS of (7) and RHS of (7) depends 
on the factors such as the effects of the external economies of scale (i.e., λ′), the 
labor coefficient (i.e., λ ), the unions’ preference for wage and employment (i.e., θ ) 
and the unions’ bargaining power (i.e., β ). We will show in the following analysis 
that LHS of (7) can be higher or lower than RHS of (7). However, whether the former 
is higher than the latter for higher or lower values of n is not immediate.  
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2 2 λλλ ′′ ′ < , i.e., if the effects of external economies of scale are strong 
(i.e., λ′ is high), the labor coefficients are small (i.e., λ  is small) and the effect of n 7 
 








 only if  ()
2 2 λλ λ ′′ ′ > . 
To show our point in the easiest way, we will consider two separate cases in 

























depending on n. Since this complication will not add much new insight to our 
analysis, we ignore this complication. 
 

















. We draw LHS of (7) and RHS of (7) in Figures 
1 and 2. While Figure 1 considers the case of 
1 1
n Z
= > , Figure 2 considers the case of 
1 1
n Z








 for  1 n > , which can occur, as 
shown in the examples below, and for simplicity, we draw RHS of (7) as a straight 
line. 
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, the curves LHS and RHS intersect in 
Figure 1
3 while there is no intersection between LHS and RHS in Figure 1. 
It follows from Figure 1 (where 
1 1
n Z
= > ) that higher competition (i.e., higher 
values of n) increases (decreases) the unionized wage for 
* nn >  (
* nn < ). Note that 
1 1
n Z
= >  occurs if λ  is sufficiently high compared to  λ′ −  at n = 1, i.e., the labor 
coefficient in the absence of external economies of scale (which is the case for n = 1) 
is sufficiently high compared to the effects of the external economies of scale at the 
beginning. Hence, for low values of n (i.e., if the initial product market competition is 
low), the effects of the external economies of scale are dominated by the competition 
effect and the increase in competition reduces the unionized wage. However, as 
competition increases, the effects of competition on labor demand tend to fall due to 
the fall in the labor coefficients. Hence, after a critical level of competition, the effects 
of the external economies of scale start dominating the effects of competition, thus 
                                                 
3 It is easy to see that LHS of (7) can intersect RHS of (7) for larger n. For example, this happens if the 
effects of the external economies of scale are such that λ  is sufficiently small for a large but finite n.  9 
 
increasing the unionized wage following higher competition if the competition is 
sufficiently high. 
However, Figure 2 shows the situation for 
1 1
n Z
= < , which implies that λ  is 
sufficiently low compared to  λ′ −  at n = 1, i.e., the labor coefficient in the absence of 
external economies of scale (which is the case for n = 1) is sufficiently low compared 
to the effects of the external economies of scale at the beginning. Hence, from the 
beginning, the effects of competition on the labor demand are weak compared to the 
effects of the external economies of scale. Therefore, as competition increases, the 
latter effect always dominates the former effect and creates higher unionized wage 
following higher competition.  
  The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
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* () nn >< , where  () nZ n =  at 




= < , higher competition increases the unionized wage for  1 n > . 
 
Let us now consider two examples to show the cases shown in Figures 1 and 
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* 1 n >  for  [0,0.5] θ ∈  and  [0,1) β ∈ , suggesting that 
higher competition increases (decreases) the unionized wage for 
* () nn >< .  
Now consider the case where  () n
n
λ
λ = . This situation will correspond to the 
case of Figure 2. We get that  2 0
L
n



























= < . Hence,  ( ) nZ n >  for  1 n > , suggesting that higher 
competition increases the unionized wage for  1 n > . 
 

























ββ θ λ λ λ
βλ
⎡⎤ ′′ ′ −− − + ⎣⎦ >
′ −
. 
  Following the argument of the previous subsection, it is easy to understand 











= > , since, in this situation, RHS of (7) is higher than LHS of (7) for  1 n > . 



















 for  1 n > , 
which can occur, as shown in the example below. For simplicity, we draw RHS of (7) 
as a straight line. 11 
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It follows from Figure 3 that higher competition increases (decreases) the unionized 
wage for 
** nn <  (
** nn > ).
4 Hence, in contrast to Figure 1, where higher competition 
increases (decreases) the unionized wage for higher (lower) values of n, here higher 
competition increases (decreases) the unionized wage for lower (higher) values of n. 








 is summarized in Proposition 2. 
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** () nn <> , where  () nZ n =  at 
** n . 
 








 provided λλ′′  is 
sufficiently higher than  ()
2 2 λ′ , which can occur if, ceteris paribus, λ  is sufficiently 
                                                 
4 It is evident from our example below that the curves in Figure 3 can intersect. 12 
 
high. Moreover, if λ  is sufficiently high compared to λ′, we get 
1 1
n Z
= > . This 
implies that if the labor productivity is very low (i.e., labor coefficient is very high) to 
start with and the effects of the external economies of scale are not very strong, the 
effect of competition always dominates the effects of the external economies of scale 
to reduce the unionized wage following higher competition. This is because higher 
competition reduces the labor demand significantly due to the high labor coefficient, 
and this loss is not compensated by the positive effects of the external economies of 
scale. 








 but it is not high enough 
compared to λ′, we get 
1 1
n Z
= < . In this situation, we can get that higher competition 
increases (deceases) the unionized wage for if the competition is low (high), i.e., n is 
low (high). This happens for the following reason. Relatively stronger effect of the 
external economies of scale initially compensates the loss of labor demand due to 
higher competition. Hence, an increase in competition increases the unionized wage if 
competition is low. However, as competition increases, the effects of the external 
economies of scale reduce significantly if the diminishing returns on the external 
economies of scale are high (i.e., λ′′ is high). Hence, if competition is very high, the 
effects of the external economies of scale fade out and reduce the unionized wage 
following higher competition. 
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suggesting that higher competition increases (decreases) the unionized wage for 
** () nn <> . 
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 for  1 n > . However, we get 
1 1
n Z
= >  in this 
situation, suggesting that higher competition decreases the unionized wage for  1 n > .    
 
3. Conclusion 
The influential theoretical work of Dowrick (1989) shows that higher product market 
competition reduces unionized wage in the presence of firm-specific union-firm 
bargaining. We show that this is not necessarily the case in the presence of external of 
economies of scale, which can be found in several industries. Higher competition may 
increase the unionized wage under external economies of scale. In this respect, the 
labor productivity and the effects of the external economies of scale may play 
important roles. Thus, in contrast to the current explanation for the positive relation 
between competition and unionized wage based on the open-shop union (Bastos et al., 
2010), where the union density is less than one, we provide a new rationale for the 
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